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END OF THE DIALOGUE?
POLITICAL POLARIZATION, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND CONGRESS
RICHARD L. HASEN*

INTRODUCTION
On the last of three historic days of oral argument considering the
constitutionality of the Obama Administration’s health care law, the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court turned to the question of
severability: if the Court struck down one or more major components of the
law, should the entire, over 900-page law1 fall as well, or should the Court
sever the unconstitutional parts and preserve the rest of it? One of the
lawyers arguing in favor of severability contended that even if the Court
struck down the heart of the law, “yes, Congress would have wanted”2
other provisions kept intact, such as those giving new benefits for victims
of black lung disease. In response, Justice Kennedy asked: “the real
Congress or a hypothetical Congress?”3 The audience laughed.4
Justice Kennedy’s response was funny, but the issue was serious. The
Justices were well aware that the health care law barely passed on a partyline vote, thanks to some arm-twisting by the Democratic Obama
* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine School
of Law. Thanks to Sam Bagenstos, Jeb Barnes, Larry Baum, Jim Brudey, Erwin Chemerinsky, Neal
Devins, Bill Eskridge, Beth Garrett, Hal Krent, Sarah Lawsky, Marty Lederman, Sandy Levinson,
David Mayhew, Rick Pildes, Michael Solimine, Michael Waterstone, Timothy Zick, and participants at
a William & Mary Law School workshop for useful comments and suggestions, Keith Poole and Chris
Hare for their help with Voteview.com data and figures, James Buatti for excellent and tireless research
assistance, and Ellen Augustiniak, Dianna Sahhar, and Christina Tsou for wonderful library assistance.
1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (“The ACA is over 900
pages long.”) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Trans.
LEXIS 28 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400).
3. Id.
4. Id. (noting audience laughter).
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administration, unusual procedural maneuverings between the House and
Senate, and side deals to bring along wary moderate Democrats.5 At oral
argument Justice Scalia referred to the so-called “Cornhusker kickback,” a
sweetheart deal for Nebraska which was at one point inserted in the law
(and later removed) to ensure Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson’s vote.6
Partisan acrimony over the health care law only intensified when
Republicans took back control of the House and Democrats lost their brief,
sixty-vote filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. Republicans vowed to
overturn what they called “Obamacare,” and they took over thirty votes in
the House to do just that, with their efforts predictably never picked up by
the majority Democratic Senate.7 The partisan divide was national, with
twenty-six states—all led by Republicans—filing a brief with the Supreme
Court opposing the constitutionality of the health care law.8
By the time of the oral argument, the Justices knew that the Court’s
decision on which provisions of the health care law remained valid would
likely be the final word. This was due to the United States Senate’s rules,
which require sixty votes to make changes to most laws, and the fact that
partisan polarization and a closely-divided Senate meant that neither party
had sixty votes to alter the status quo. In response to the lawyer’s plea for
severability at oral argument, Justice Scalia responded:
You can’t repeal the rest of the Act because you’re not going to get 60
votes in the Senate to repeal the rest. It’s not a matter of enacting a new
5. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Final Votes in Congress Cap Battle on Health Bill,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
26,
2010,
at
A17,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/health/policy/26health.html; Robert Pear & David M.
Herszenhorn, Obama Hails Vote on Health Care as Answering ‘the Call of History,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/health/policy/22health.html; Josh
Gerstein,
Pork
Greased
Reform’s
Passage,
POLITICO
(Dec.
22,
2009),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30877.html.
6. Olivier Knox, Scalia Mocks Health Care Law ‘Cornhusker Kickback’ Provision—That No
Longer Exists, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 28, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/scalia-mockshealth-care-law-cornhusker-kickback-provision-205148292.html. Nelson voted against the health care
law. Herszenhorn & Pear, supra note 5.
7. Robert Pear, Repeal of Health Care Law Approved, Again, by House, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
2012, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/health/policy/house-votes-again-torepeal-health-law.html.
8. Linda Greenhouse, Never Before, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Mar. 21, 2012, 9:00 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/never-before/ (“Republican officeholders in all 26
states joined together in the case now known as United States Department of Health and Human
Services v. State of Florida. In 22 of those states, the officeholder was the attorney general. In four
states with Democratic attorneys general (Nevada, Wyoming, Iowa and Mississippi), Republican
governors filed in their own names.”).
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act. You’ve got to get 60 votes to repeal it. So [if the Court severs the
unconstitutional parts] the rest of the Act is going to be the law. 9

The Court’s recognition of the political reality at oral argument was
not matched in the 193 pages of opinions in the case. The Justices’ analysis
of the health care law gave no inkling of the intense partisan atmosphere
surrounding the law or the legal challenge. When the Justices stated their
varying opinions on severability,10 none mentioned the fact that the Court’s
word was likely to be final because of partisan deadlock, even as four
dissenters said that the rest of the law was not severable and it all needed to
fall. That is not to say that the issue of congressional polarization was out
of the Justices’ thoughts as they wrote their opinions. Instead, legal
doctrine had not expressly recognized the defining feature of modern
American politics: deep political polarization along party lines.
Nor did the Justices expressly acknowledge that their own decision in
the health care case would play into partisan politics and the upcoming
presidential election. Partisan realignment hit Congress a long time ago, as
Southern Democrats abandoned the Democratic Party and liberal
Republicans lost their elections, moved to the right, or retired, to the point
that the most liberal Republican in Congress today is more conservative
than the most conservative Democrat. But the partisan realignment of the
Supreme Court is much more recent. It occurred only in 2011, when
liberal/moderate Republican-nominated Justice John Paul Stevens retired,
replaced by liberal Democrat-nominated Elena Kagan. The Court now has
five conservative Justices who are all Republicans, and four liberal Justices
who are all Democrats.11
A 5-4 party split in the health care case threatened the legitimacy of
the Supreme Court, which had already begun to see an unprecedented
decline in popularity among the public.12 Chief Justice Roberts’ surprise
decision to vote with the four liberal Democrats to uphold the health care
law startled Republicans and was viewed as a major victory for President
9. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 67. Some have suggested that had Republicans
retaken control of the Senate, they could have tried to use the “reconciliation” process to repeal the
health care law. Reconciliation bills are not subject to a Senate filibuster. For the difficulties
Republicans would face in overturning the health care law even using reconciliation, see Ryan Lizza,
Why Romney Won’t Repeal Obamacare, THE NEW YORKER NEWS DESK (June 28, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/06/why-romney-wont-repeal-obamacare.html.
10. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012); id. at 2668–77
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting).
11. See infra Part III.A. I refer to the Justices as “Democrats” or “Republicans” to indicate which
party nominated that Justice.
12. See infra Part III.B.
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Obama’s reelection chances.13 Roberts’ popularity among Republicans
unsurprisingly declined sharply following the health care decision,14 but
likely would rise again if he voted, as expected, to strike down affirmative
action in education, to strike down parts of the Voting Rights Act, and to
uphold new abortion restrictions. The effect of future partisan-divided
Supreme Court decisions on public opinion remains uncertain.
This Article considers the likely effects of continued political
polarization on the relative power of Congress and the Supreme Court.15
Polarization is already leading to an increase in the power of the Court
against Congress, whether or not the Justices affirmatively seek that
additional power. The governing model of congressional-Supreme Court
relations is that the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation:
Congress writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress
has the power to overrule the Court’s interpretations. The Court’s
interpretive rules are premised upon this dialogic model, such as the rule
that Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents are subject to “super
strong” stare decisis protection because Congress can always correct an
errant court interpretation. Legislation scholars also write as though
congressional overriding remains common.16
13. Jim Malone, Analysts: Supreme Court Health Care Ruling Helps Obama, VOICE OF
AMERICA (June 28, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/analysts-say-supreme-court-health-careruling-helps-obama/1349054.html.
14. Kevin Robillard, Poll: GOP Down on John Roberts, Dems Up, POLITICO (July 16, 2012),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78562.html.
15. The presidency’s strength against Congress also has been growing as a result of political
polarization, which has provided an opening for unilateral presidential action on both domestic and
foreign affairs. See Matthew N. Beckmann & Anthony J. McGann, Navigating the Legislative Divide:
Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States, 20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 201, 201–02
(2008); Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s Congress
Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 396–97
(2009); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the
Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 491–96 (2008); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2342–47 (2006); Jide Nzelibe,
Partisan Conflicts Over Presidential Authority, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 389, 392–95 (2011).
Although the Bush presidency was known for its “unitary executive” theory and assertions of executive
power, President Obama also has taken some notable steps to assert unilateral power, such as his recent
executive order which will allow “[h]undreds of thousands of illegal immigrants who came to the
United States as children [to] be allowed to remain in the country without fear of deportation and able
to work.” Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stopdeporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?hp. He took this step following the inability of Congress to
pass legislation accomplishing similar ends. The Supreme Court’s decisions on executive power also
affect congressional-presidential relations. These important developments are beyond the scope of this
Article.
16. See infra Part I.B.
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In fact, in the last two decades the rate of Congressional overriding of
Supreme Court statutory decisions has plummeted dramatically, from an
average of twelve overrides of Supreme Court cases in each two-year
Congressional term during the 1975–1990 period, to an average of 5.8
overrides for each term from 1991 to 2000, and to a mere 2.8 average
number of overrides for each term from 2001 to 2012.17 Although some of
the decline seems attributable to the lower volume of Supreme Court
statutory interpretation decisions, the decline in overrides greatly outpaces
this decline in cases. Moreover, the decline does not appear driven by a
decline in the amount of overall legislation. Instead, partisanship seems to
have strongly diminished the opportunities for bipartisan overrides of
Supreme Court cases, in which Democrats and Republicans come together
to reverse the Supreme Court.18
In its place we see a new, but rarer, phenomenon, partisan overriding,
which appears to require conditions of near-unified control of both
branches of Congress and the presidency. Two recent examples are: 1) the
Military Commissions Act of 2006,19 in which Republicans overturned the
Court’s statutory interpretation decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld20 on the
habeas corpus rights of enemy combatants, and 2) the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2009,21 in which Democrats overturned the Court’s statutory
interpretation decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company22
on how to measure the statute of limitations period in certain employment
discrimination lawsuits. In a highly polarized atmosphere and with Senate
rules usually requiring sixty votes to change the status quo, the Court’s
word on the meaning of statutes is now final almost as often as its word on
constitutional interpretation.
Although political polarization has benefitted the Supreme Court’s
power relative to Congress in the short term, the longer term power
relations are more uncertain. Aside from the statutory interpretation
dialogue, Congress interacts with the Supreme Court in other ways,
including through Senate confirmation of Supreme Court judicial
nominees. The recent partisan realignment of the Supreme Court makes it
more likely that a Supreme Court judicial nominee will be filibustered in
the Senate, thanks to the increasing willingness of senators to oppose
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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nominees on ideological grounds and increased partisan polarization in the
Senate. The number of senators from the opposing party of the nominating
president voting against Supreme Court nominees is approaching or
exceeding the filibuster level. Depending upon how the politics play out in
a possible filibuster of a Supreme Court judicial nominee, we may see
either an erosion of the use of the filibuster in the Senate or a compromise
which would weaken the power of the judiciary, such as term limits
imposed upon future Supreme Court Justices.23
Part I of this Article demonstrates that despite the model of CongressCourt dialogue, and Supreme Court statutory interpretation tools premised
on that dialogue, congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory
interpretation precedents have become exceedingly rare. The effect of this
change is to empower the Court over Congress. Part II argues that the steep
decline in overrides over the last two decades appears to be due in large
part to increased polarization in Congress and not simply to a decline in the
number of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases. When Congress
does override a Supreme Court case, it is now more likely to be a partisan
override, pushed through in periods of unified government. Part III is more
speculative, and considers a different aspect of the role political
polarization plays in the relationship between Congress and the Supreme
Court. It considers how polarization in Congress and the partisan
realignment of the Supreme Court—a Court in which all the conservative
Justices are Republicans and all the liberal Justices are Democrats—may
eventually lead to a major confrontation in Congress over the power of the
Senate filibuster. That confrontation may leave the Senate, the Supreme
Court, or both, looking very different than they are today. Furthermore,
partisan realignment has the potential to harm the Supreme Court’s
legitimacy in a way which we have not witnessed in modern times.
I. THE DECLINE IN CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME
COURT STATUTORY DECISIONS
A. THE DIALOGIC MODEL IN THEORY
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to pass
federal legislation (upon the president’s agreement or an overriding of a
veto24) and the judiciary the power to review cases arising under these
23.
24.

See infra Part III.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7.

HASE7

2012]

1/25/2013 12:30 PM

POLITICAL POLARIZATION

107

“Laws of the United States.”25 The Supreme Court (or a lower court)
sometimes strikes down a federal statute as unconstitutional. In response,
members of Congress occasionally introduce constitutional amendments to
overturn these rulings, and congressional committees hold hearings on
proposed constitutional amendments. For example, Congress has
considered overturning the Supreme Court’s ruling that flag-burning
constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment26 and overturning the
Court’s recent ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission27
affording business corporations the right to spend their general treasury
funds on candidate election campaigns.28 But the very difficult
supermajority requirements for a constitutional amendment—two-thirds of
Congress and three-quarters of state legislatures must agree—usually
leaves the Court’s constitutional decisions standing.
In contrast to judicial pronouncements about the constitutionality of
federal statutes, which can be overridden solely through the arduous
constitutional amendment process, Congress has the power to override a
judicial interpretation of a federal statute simply by passing a new or
amended statute under the normal rules for passing legislation.29
The Supreme Court has premised its rules for interpreting federal
statutes on this dialogic model in which Congress may correct the Supreme
Court’s errors of statutory interpretation.30 Most importantly, the Court
applies what William Eskridge has called a “super-strong presumption” of
25. Id., art. III, § 2.
26. Mike Allen, House Passes Constitutional Amendment to Ban Flag Burning, WASH. POST,
June
23,
2005,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/22/AR2005062202155.html.
27. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
28. Warren Richey, Constitutional Amendment Required to Undo Citizens United, Senate Panel
Told,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR,
July
24,
2012,
available
at
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0724/Constitutional-amendment-required-to-undoCitizens-United-Senate-panel-told.
29. I am using the definition of “override” set forth in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991) (“A
congressional ‘override’ includes a statute that: (1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory
interpretation decision, just as a subsequent Court would overrule an unsatisfactory precedent;
(2) modifies the result of a decision in some material way, such that the same case would have been
decided differently; or (3) modifies the consequences of the decision, such that the same case would
have been decided in the same way but subsequent cases would be decided differently. . . . ‘[O]verride’
[does not] include statutes for which the legislative history—mainly committee reports and hearings—
does not reveal a legislative focus on judicial decisions.”).
30. For a detailed and critical look at these canons, see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker,
The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425,
428–33 (1992).
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stare decisis for statutory rulings.31 The leading application, Flood v.
Kuhn,32 involved the Supreme Court’s failure to overturn earlier precedents
which had concluded that professional baseball was exempt from federal
antitrust laws. In the years after the Court had initially held that baseball
was entitled to an exception, the Court then inconsistently held that
professional boxing and professional football were not entitled to such an
exemption. In Flood, the Court reaffirmed its earlier inconsistent precedent
giving baseball the exemption even though “[i]t appears that every member
of the Court thought that [the earlier precedent] was wrongly decided.”33
Justice Blackmun, for the Court, wrote that “[i]f there is any inconsistency
or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long standing that
is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court.”34
Other Court statutory interpretation doctrines also presume the ability
of Congress to correct an errant statutory precedent. The Court has justified
literal-if-illogical applications of congressional statutes on grounds that
Congress can fix any drafting problems in response to the Court’s
decision.35 As the Court wrote in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., a
case allowing for an exceedingly large penalty under federal maritime law,
“The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies
with Congress and not with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; we
may not.”36
Three statutory construction rules related to legislative inaction,
sometimes applied by the Court, also presume Congress’s ability to
override mistaken court interpretations of federal statutes. Under the
acquiescence rule, “[i]f Congress is aware of an authoritative agency or
judicial interpretation of a statute and doesn’t amend the statute, the Court
has sometimes presumed that Congress has ‘acquiesced’ in the
interpretation’s correctness.”37 Under the reenactment rule, “[i]f Congress
reenacts a statute without making any material changes in its wording, the
Court will often presume that Congress intends to incorporate authoritative
agency and judicial interpretations of that language into the reenacted
31.
32.
33.

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1366 (1988).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 640 (4th ed. 2007).
34. Flood, 407 U.S. at 284.
35. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 520 & n.32 (2009).
36. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982).
37. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 33, at 1048.
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statute.”38 For example, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,39 the Court
noted that in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Congress overrode a number of
the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions regarding Title VII hostile
work environment claims but Congress did not override the Court’s earlier
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.40 The Court therefore
concluded that its earlier interpretation in Meritor was sound.41 Under the
rejected proposal rule, “[i]f Congress (in conference committee) or one
chamber (on the floor) considers and rejects specific statutory language, the
Court has often been reluctant to interpret the statute along lines of the
rejected language.”42
Finally, in explaining application of the severability test for federal
legislation, the dissenting Justices in the recent health care case premised
their arguments for striking down the whole statute (and not severing the
unconstitutional parts) on the ability of Congress to restore any parts of the
law worthy of restoration:
The Judiciary, if it orders uncritical severance, then assumes the
legislative function; for it imposes on the Nation, by the Court’s decree,
its own new statutory regime, consisting of policies, risks, and duties that
Congress did not enact. That can be a more extreme exercise of the
judicial power than striking the whole statute and allowing Congress to
address the conditions that pertained when the statute was considered at
the outset.43
38. Id. (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”) (quoting Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)). Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner give qualified support to this rule in
their recent book. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 322–26 (2012). However, they do not base it in legislative agreement, but instead on the
fact that “members of the bar practicing in that field reasonably enough assume that, in statutes
pertaining to that field, the term bears this same meaning. . . . This footing is sounder than the fanciful
presumption of legislative knowledge.” Id. at 324.
39. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
40. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
41. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 n.4 (“We are bound to honor Meritor on this point not merely
because of the high value placed on stare decisis in statutory interpretation, but for a further reason as
well. With the amendments enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress both expanded the
monetary relief available under Title VII to include compensatory and punitive damages, and modified
the statutory grounds of several of our decisions. The decision of Congress to leave Meritor intact is
conspicuous. We thus have to assume that in expanding employers’ potential liability under Title VII,
Congress relied on our statements in Meritor about the limits of employer liability. To disregard those
statements now (even if we were convinced of reasons for doing so) would be not only to disregard
stare decisis in statutory interpretation, but to substitute our revised judgment about the proper
allocation of the costs of harassment for Congress’s considered decision on the subject.”) (citations
omitted). See also ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 33, at 1049 (discussing Faragher).
42. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & Garrett, supra note 33, at 1049.
43. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2668 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy,
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B. THE DIALOGIC MODEL IN PRACTICE OVER TIME
1. 1967–1990
Many scholars have examined the circumstances under which
Congress responds to a Supreme Court decision through a legislative
override and how the Court reacts to such overrides.44 In the idealized
pluralistic model of politics and dialogue, “[i]f litigation reveals statutory
flaws, or produces objectionable judicial interpretations, interest groups can
appeal to Congress, which can scrutinize the courts’ decisions and revise
the original statute in light of lessons learned from litigation.”45
William Eskridge’s leading 1991 study, using an empirical analysis of
overrides, game theory, and positive political theory, presented a more
nuanced picture of how the Court interprets federal statutes. He argued that
“the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions are more responsive to the
expectations of the current Congress than to those of the enacting
Congress. But the Court is also responsive to its own institutional and
personal preferences—especially its preference for coherence and
predictability in the law.”46
Consistent with Eskridge, there is a broad, technical literature in
Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The dissenters would have struck down the entire
health care law, including non-germane provisions such as one requiring chain restaurants to display
nutritional content:
The Court has not previously had occasion to consider severability in the context of an
omnibus enactment like the ACA, which includes not only many provisions that are ancillary
to its central provisions but also many that are entirely unrelated—hitched on because it was a
quick way to get them passed despite opposition, or because their proponents could exact
their enactment as the quid pro quo for their needed support. When we are confronted with
such a so-called ‘Christmas tree,’ a law to which many nongermane ornaments have been
attached, we think the proper rule must be that when the tree no longer exists the ornaments
are superfluous. We have no reliable basis for knowing which pieces of the Act would have
passed on their own. It is certain that many of them would not have, and it is not a proper
function of this Court to guess which. To sever the statute in that manner would be to make a
new law, not to enforce an old one. This is not part of our duty.
Id. at 2675–76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. See, e.g., JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS (2004); Eskridge, supra note 29; Lori Hausegger &
Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in
GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990S 224 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C.
Patterson eds., 1998); Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the
Supreme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143, 198–205 (1991); Solimine & Walker, supra note 30; Widiss, supra
note 35. For a detailed look at Congress’s overrides of Supreme Court preemption decisions, see Note,
New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional
Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604 (2007).
45. BARNES, supra note 44, at 6.
46. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 334.
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public choice and positive political theory which generally posits that the
Justices seek to interpret federal statutes as close as possible to their own
preferences without being overridden by Congress.47 The chances of
congressional override depend not only upon the preferences of the median
member of Congress but also upon the preferences of committee chairs and
party leaders, who act as the gatekeepers for legislation.
Jeb Barnes’ detailed study of one hundred randomly-selected
overrides in the 1974–1990 period found that “members of Congress—or,
more precisely, members of prestige and re-election committees—tend to
draft more comprehensive and effective overrides, especially when the
override issue involves the collection of tax revenue.”48 Further, “if the
override issue split the courts along partisan lines in the pre-override
period, federal judges seemed more likely to resist congressional oversight,
especially when the issue involved the interpretation of the statutory rights
of discrete, insular minorities, such as African Americans or immigrants.”49
Nancy Staudt, René Lindstädt, and Jason O’Connor canvassed all
express congressional responses—and not just overrides—to Supreme
Court tax decisions from 1954 to 2005. The authors found that:
[T]he Court-Congress dynamic is not unidimensional but rather nuanced
and varied. The existing literature implies when Congress responds to
the Court, it does so in a hostile manner. To be sure, judicial decisions
often spark a negative response in Congress, but nearly as often the cases
lead to supportive and positive responses, like codification legislation.50

Most recently, Deborah Widiss has written a pair of articles examining
congressional overrides in the employment law context. In the first article,
she demonstrated that the Supreme Court often narrowly construes
47. See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
263 (1990); Thomas G. Hansford & David F. Damore, Congressional Preferences, Perceptions of
Threat, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 28 AM. POL. Q. 490 (2000); Virginia A. Hettinger &
Christopher Zorn, Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S.
Supreme Court, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2005); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or
Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949–
1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992). For some skepticism about the approach, see Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28
(1997).
48. BARNES, supra note 44, at 18.
49. Id.
50. Nancy C. Staudt, René Lindstädt, & Jason O’Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation:
Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1401
(2007).
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congressional override attempts.51 In the second article, she showed that the
Court often sidesteps congressional overrides when construing similar
language in a parallel statute,52 in apparent violation of the rule to interpret
identical language in related statutes to mean the same thing in each
statute.53
Eskridge’s 1991 article on overrides was an important corrective to
the belief that congressional overrides were rare.54 Whether or not the total
number of overrides has in the past counted as “rare” in any absolute sense,
in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress used its override power with increasing
frequency. As Eskridge described:
The four Congresses from 1967–74 generated an average of six Supreme
Court overrides per [two-year congressional period], not many more than
the numbers uncovered in prior studies. In contrast, the eight Congresses
from 1975–90, beginning with the 94th, generated an average of twelve
Supreme Court overrides per [two-year congressional period].55

Like Eskridge’s study, Barnes’s study ended with an examination of
congressional overrides occurring in 1990.56 Barnes found that “[d]espite
obstacles, absolute levels of congressional override activity have
increased.”57 Although Eskridge’s empirical study ended with 1990, his
article also described the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overrode at least
ten Supreme Court cases.58
51. Widiss, supra note 35.
52. Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory
Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859 (2012).
53. Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner endorse the canon, but reject its basis as following the
Legislature’s intent:
Though it is often presented as effectuating the legislative “intent,” the related-statute canon is
not, to tell the truth, based upon a realistic assessment of what the legislature actually meant.
That would assume an implausible legislative knowledge of related legislation in the past, and
an impossible legislative knowledge of related legislation yet to be enacted.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 252. They justify the canon as based on “a realistic assessment of
what the legislature ought to have meant.” Id.
54. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 335. But see Bertrall L. Ross, II, Against Constitutional
Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1228 (2011) (“[O]verrides are exceedingly rare, making it
risky to rely on them as a means of ensuring consistency between the Court’s statutory interpretations
and legislative preferences. In fact, one scholar . . . famously argued [in 1960] that statutory overrides
are so rare that the Court’s interpretation of statutes is ‘hardly less “final” than the Court’s decisions
interpreting the Constitution.’”).
55. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 338.
56. BARNES, supra note 44, at 15.
57. Id. at 43 (italics omitted). See also id. at 44 (“Congress is increasingly relying on the passage
of overrides as a check on the courts”).
58. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 333 n.4. I say “at least” ten because Eskridge counts more than
ten as overrides. But using Eskridge’s own methodology, my results count ten overruled cases, with the
other cases modified or clarified, but not overruled. See Appendix I.
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In 2005, Barnes noted that there might be a need for congressional
overrides to rise over time:
Congress may need to revise statutes because today’s statutes may be
increasingly prone to obsolescence and inconsistency; today’s Supreme
Court is increasingly overwhelmed and less likely to harmonize
conflicting lower court statutory interpretations; and today’s federal
judges have greater opportunities to overreach—from the right or the
left—under the guise of statutory interpretation. 59

2. 1991–2012
Perhaps because of the strength of the evidence of a rise in override
activity reported in the earlier studies, scholars have failed to notice that
congressional overruling of Supreme Court cases slowed down
dramatically since 1991 and essentially halted in January 2009. Thus,
writing in 2012, James Brudney stated that “[a]s scholars in law and
political science have observed, Congress has become more inclined to
override Court decisions since the early 1970s.”60 Similarly, the 2005 study
of congressional responses to Supreme Court tax decisions over a fifty-oneyear period by Staudt, Lindstädt, and O’Connor failed to note that of the
twelve overrides of tax decisions by Congress in the 1954–2005 period,
only two occurred later than 1986 (and the last in 2001).61
I examined evidence of congressional overrides of Supreme Court
statutory interpretation decisions from the end of Eskridge’s study (ending
in 1990) to the end of 2012, trying my best to replicate Eskridge’s
methodology so as to allow for an apples-to-apples comparison of
congressional override activity.62 This proved to be methodologically
difficult, in part because Congress is now less likely to note the overruling
of a Supreme Court opinion in a committee report. The Methodological
Appendix (Appendix IV) at the end of this Article describes in detail how I
sought to identify overrides from 1991 to 2012; in addition, I erred on the
59. BARNES, supra note 44, at 34.
60. James J. Brudney, Distrust and Clarify: Appreciating Congressional Overrides, 90 TEX. L.
REV.
SEE
ALSO
205,
212
(2012),
available
at
http://texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol90/pdf/Brudney.pdf.
61. Staudt, Lindstädt & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 1384 n.169.
62. Eskridge describes his methodology in Eskridge, supra note 29, at 418–20. Hausegger and
Baum, using what they describe as “similar search methods” to Eskridge’s, identified eight overrides.
Hausegger & Baum, supra note 44, at 227, 231–32. Hausegger and Baum graciously shared their list of
1991–96 overrides with me. Our lists overlap but are not entirely consistent given different definitions
of “override.” For example, both they and I identify eight overrides in the 1995–96 period, although we
have not made identical judgments on which statutes qualify as overrides. Hausegger and Baum’s list is
on file with the author.
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side of inclusion in doubtful cases.
The results are dramatic: according to Eskridge’s data, the number of
overrides rose from an average of six Supreme Court overrides per
Congress in the years 1967–1974 to twelve overrides per Congress in the
years 1975–1990. According to my updated data, overrides then fell to 5.8
per Congress from 1991 to 2000 and fell even further to 2.8 overrides per
Congress from 2001 to 2012.63 See Figure 1.

The 5.8 average overrides per Congress in the 1991–2000 period may
overstate the amount of override activity, as it is heavily influenced by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, a single law which overturned ten Supreme Court
cases.
Overrides have slowed to a trickle in the last four years. Congress
passed two technical overrides in 2011, one involving trademark issues and
the other a court venue provision.64 The last significant congressional
overrides occurred in early 2009. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
the first bill signed by President Obama, overturned a Supreme Court
employment decision.65 In addition, the Family Smoking and Tobacco Act
of 2009 responded to a 2000 Supreme Court decision, giving the FDA
63. I list all the overridden cases I discovered in Appendix I.
64. See Appendix I.
65. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html.
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some authority to regulate tobacco.66 See Figure 2, showing a dramatic
drop in the number of congressional overrides.

3. A Closer Look at Post-2000 Congressional Overrides
In the twelve years since January 2001, Congress has passed only
fourteen pieces of legislation overriding Supreme Court decisions, and
overriding a total of seventeen Supreme Court statutory interpretation
decisions. The overrides fall into three categories: technical overrides,
bipartisan overrides, and partisan overrides.
a. Technical overrides
Seven of the bills since 2001 were technical overrides contained in
larger bills. These overrides likely did not garner the attention of many
members of Congress, with some overrides folded in much larger bills and
not subject to debate.67 These seven bills included eight overrides making
66. Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A15,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/us/politics/23obama.html?_r=0. See Appendix IV.
67. I classify an override as “technical” if the New York Times contained no article the same year
as the bill’s passage noting that Congress was considering overriding, or in fact overrode, one or more
Supreme Court cases. See also Hausegger & Baum, supra note 44, at 228 (noting that many overrides
are contained in larger bills where “[i]n all likelihood their inclusion in a bill had little effect on its
passage; rather, the override was successful because a bill had congressional support for other reasons.
In several instances it is doubtful that most members of Congress were even aware of the override
provisions . . . .”) (citation omitted).
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generally minor changes to Supreme Court statutory precedent.68
b. Bipartisan overrides
Two of the six non-technical override bills passed with broad
bipartisan majorities. One bill amended the Americans with Disabilities
Act to strengthen its protections.69 Another renewed expiring provisions of
the Voting Rights Act for another twenty-five years and changed the
standards for proving discrimination under the Act.70 Each bill reversed
two major Supreme Court statutory precedents, and each bill passed in
large part thanks to the strong leadership and support of the then-chair of
the House Judiciary Committee, James Sensenbrenner (R-WI). It is unclear
68. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21
(2002), included a reversal of Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001), a case involving “narrow
and technical” tax issues concerning the “correct method for determining basis in S Corporation stock.”
Staudt, Lindstädt, & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 1353 n.37. See also H.R. REP. NO. 107-251, at 52
(2001); H.R. REP. NO. 107-367, at 3 (2002). The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231
(2005), included a provision reversing a Supreme Court case on the habeas corpus rights of immigrants
accused of crimes, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 173–76 (2005).
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006), eased the
standard of proof for trademark holders in dilution claims, overruling Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). See H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 5 (2005). The OPEN Government Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007), reversed a major Supreme Court opinion on attorney fees
in public interest litigation, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), but only as to attorney fees in litigation related to
FOIA requests. H.R. REP. NO. 110-59, at 4 (2007) (discussing an earlier version of the Act containing
the same relevant language as the Act ultimately passed). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), “responds to the decision of Holmes Group, Inc., v.
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., by conferring plenary authority on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to hear all patent appeals from lower courts.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-407, at 3 (2006);
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 81 (2011) (explicitly endorsing the earlier H.R. REP. NO. 109-407’s
explanation “for abrogating Holmes”). The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) reversed two Supreme Court cases dealing with the standard for proving
federal money laundering violations. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4, 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009
U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011), reversed a 1960 decision, Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), to
craft a more permissive venue rule in certain federal cases. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 23–24 (2011),
reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576.
69. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The Act’s
language rejected Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). See Appendix I.
70. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). The Act’s language reversed
two Supreme Court cases, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) and Reno v. Bossier Parish School
Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000), which “misconstrued Congress’ original intent in enacting the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and narrowed the protections afforded by section 5 of such Act.” H.R. REP. NO.
109-478, at 2 (2006). The 2006 Amendments were intended to “restore the original purpose to Section 5
with respect to intentionally discriminatory voting changes.” Id. at 65.
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whether either bill would have passed without Sensenbrenner’s interest,
passion, and power.71
The ADA Amendments clearly overturned Supreme Court (and lower
court) precedent in a number of important ways, although they left some
key statutory questions unresolved.72
As for the Voting Rights Act (VRA) amendments, the story is more
complicated. Nathaniel Persily explained that Congress’s overriding of one
of the two Supreme Court voting rights decisions, Georgia v. Ashcroft, was
done in a deliberately murky way to avoid a deep partisan divide about the
workings of the Act.73
The procedure by which the VRA Amendments passed was highly
unusual, as Richard Pildes explained:
[T]he enacted law was “virtually unchanged” from the version first
introduced in the House. . . . [I]t is widely known that the bill was
drafted by the civil rights community, then pushed through the House
process by Chairman Sensenbrenner, for whom, as Persily does note,
“nothing was going to stand in [the] way.” The House hearings were not
designed to provide a full airing of the issues, but for advocates to build
71. See Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 195–96 (2008) (“The first serious breakthrough for the ADA Restoration
Act happened in the summer of 2006. Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), then Chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, conveyed his interest in sponsoring a bill that would restore the broad
coverage of disability under the ADA. Congressman Sensenbrenner’s wife, Cheryl Sensenbrenner, had
been on the board of the AAPD since 2003 and was an enthusiastic supporter of the ADA Restoration
Act. . . . Having a senior Republican Member of Congress and Chair of the House Judiciary Committee
express his interest in sponsoring an ADA Restoration Act significantly changed the political dynamics
around the possible success of such a bill.”); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New
Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 180–81 (2007) (“One cannot overstate the importance of the
unlikely leadership of James Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in
pushing through the legislation. He wanted the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act to occur on his
watch, and, consistent with his leadership style on other issues, nothing was going to stand in his way.
Pursuant to the rules of the Republican Conference, however, his term as Chairman was to expire at the
end of 2006, a year before section 5 of the VRA was scheduled to sunset. Therefore, the timetable for
the legislation was moved up a year, with House hearings held between October 2005 and May 2006.”).
72. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 51–54 (2009).
73. Persily, supra note 71, at 218 (“[T]here are good reasons why Congress left this important
provision [reversing Georgia v. Ashcroft] undefined. The fractious Senate Report makes clear that
Democrats and Republicans hold dramatically differing views as to what this standard requires. The
other available legislative history elides the likely political effects of various valid interpretations. The
potential interpretations of the law run the gamut from entrenching either Republican or Democratic
gerrymanders. The central conceptual disputes revolve around the types of districts and candidates
protected by the standard, the data necessary to evaluate the ability to elect, and the degree of flexibility
jurisdictions should be accorded to adapt to political changes throughout the twenty-five year tenure of
this law.”).
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what Persily calls “a lawyer’s brief,” one that would enable the renewed
VRA to withstand later constitutional challenge. In the House, virtually
none of the academics with years of expertise in the study of the VRA
were called to testify. Second, Persily exposes just how dramatically the
enacted VRA papered over and obscured the profound policy conflicts
that actually exist on these issues in Congress. While the Senate passed
the law by a 98-0 vote, the Senate Judiciary Committee could not agree
on a committee report explaining what the bill actually did, and did not
even issue the report until after the Senate had approved the bill and just
before the President signed it into law—and even then, with the support
of committee members from only one political party. 74

A third bipartisan override was the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act of 2009, which gave the Food and Drug
Administration the power to regulate tobacco as a drug.75 Congress used
the law to respond to a 2000 Supreme Court decision holding that Congress
had not given the FDA such power.76 The largest tobacco company in the
United States, Philip Morris, supported the bill, and the final vote was
broadly bipartisan77—although twenty-nine Senate Republicans (and one
Democrat) first voted to filibuster the bill.78
c. Partisan overrides
Three overrides during the 2000–2012 period divided the Congress
strongly on party lines. This contrasts sharply with the prior period, when
partisan overrides were rare.79 In the Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Congress partially reversed the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld by further limiting the habeas corpus rights of alien enemy
74. Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 148, 151 (2007).
75. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776
(2009). See Appendix IV.
76. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). See id. § 3(1); H.R. REP.
NO. 111-58(I) (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 468, 470 (noting a 2000 Supreme Court case
finding that the FDA lacked authority over tobacco products and quoting language appearing in Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161).
77. Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation Over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/business/12tobacco.html; Duff Wilson,
Congress Passes Measure on Tobacco Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at B3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/business/13tobacco.html?_r=0.
78. On the Cloture Motion S.Amdt.1247 to H.R.1256 (Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act), GOVTRACK (June 8, 2009), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s204.
79. See infra Figure 12 and accompanying text; Solimine & Walker, supra note 30, at 452
(noting that only seven of eighteen overrides identified by Eskridge during the 1981–1988 period
provoked partisan controversy).
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combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and elsewhere.80 Republicans
favored the bill in the House by a vote of 218-7 and in the Senate by a vote
of 53-1. Democrats opposed the bill in the House by a vote of 32-162 and
in the Senate by a vote of 12-32.81
In the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Congress reversed the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Company by extending the statute of limitations in certain employment
discrimination suits82. President Obama campaigned on the Republicans’
earlier blockage of this bill as an issue of equal rights for women, pushing
heavily for its passage as a presidential candidate, and the Act was the first
bill he signed as President.83 Democrats favored the bill in the House by a
vote of 247-4 and in the Senate by a vote of 54- 0 (Ted Kennedy did not
vote). Republicans opposed the bill in the House by a vote of 3-173 and in
the Senate by a vote of 4-36.84 Notably, the four Republican senators who
voted in favor of the bill were the Senate’s four Republican women
senators (Susan Collins, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Lisa Murkowski, and
Olympia Snowe).
Finally—and perhaps a bit more debatably—I classify the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 as a partisan override even though the final larger
Pentagon bill containing the override passed on a bipartisan basis. The part
of the bill consisting of an override reversed the Supreme Court’s decision
in Rasul v. Bush, which gave Guantanamo detainees the right to challenge
their detentions in civilian court.85 On an amendment to add this provision
to a larger bill, forty-two of forty-seven Democrats voting cast a vote
80. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); John Yoo, Congress to Courts: “Get Out of the War on Terror,”
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2006, at A18, available at http://www.aei.org/article/society-andculture/congress-to-courts-get-out-of-the-war-on-terror/.
81. For the House totals, see Final Vote Results for Roll Call 508 (Military Commissions Act),
Legislation & Votes, Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 29, 2006, 2:47
PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2006/roll508.xml. For the Senate totals, see U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes
109th
Congress—2nd
Session,
Legislation
&
Records,
United
States
Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2
&vote=00259 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
82. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
83. Stolberg, supra note 65; Stephanie Mencimer, Lilly Ledbetter: Obama’s Newest Ad Star,
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 23, 2008, 9:44 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/09/lilly-ledbetterobamas-newest-ad-star.
84. For the House totals, see House Vote #37 in 2009, S. 181 (111th): Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/h37 (last visited Jan. 4,
2013). For the Senate totals, see Senate Vote #14 in 2009, S. 181 (111th): Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s14 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
85. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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against the amendment.86 Despite these partisan beginnings, Democrats
ultimately voted for the final bill for a number of reasons, including the fact
that it contained another amendment barring torture of enemy combatants,
and that it was within an even broader defense bill.87 Further, Democrat
and chief conference negotiator Senator Carl Levin responded to criticism
from human rights groups for agreeing to a bill containing the detainee
court provision, explaining “that he had settled for the less damaging of
two bad outcomes, [and] saying he had deflected more onerous provisions
that House Republicans wanted, including a demand that interrogators who
abused prisoners be granted immunity from prosecution.”88
C. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEW CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES
Whether or not one subscribes to the view of positive political
theorists that Supreme Court Justices interpret federal statutes in line with
their personal preferences and their strategic calculations about the chances
of reversal, there seems to be little doubt as things currently stand that a
majority of Supreme Court Justices is usually getting its way when it
comes to statutory interpretation. Supreme Court interpretations of federal
statutes are now very likely to be final. The combination of Supreme Court
interpretive rules premised on the Court-Congress dialogue, and the failure
of Congress to override any significant number of Court interpretations of
federal statutes, has given the Justices the last word on statutory
interpretation questions almost as often as they get the last word on
constitutional questions.
86. Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/11/politics/11detain.html.
87. Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat.
2680 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)).
88. Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, Lawmakers Back Use of Evidence Coerced from Detainees,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
17,
2005,
at
A21,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/17/politics/17detain.html?_r=0. See also Carl Hulse & Eric Schmitt,
Negotiators Say Differences Over Ban on Abuse Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at A19, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/12/politics/12abuse.html. Finally, there is one override which is
difficult to classify into one of the three categories. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), was a major piece of legislation. One relatively minor provision changed the
rules for assessing the citizenship of an unincorporated association for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. In changing the standard, Congress arguably overruled a 1965 Supreme Court case, United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965). The bill was supported
mainly by Republicans. Only nineteen Democratic Senators (and one independent Senator, Jim
Jeffords, who was a Republican but then left the party and caucused with the Democrats) voted for the
bill. Senate Vote #9 in 2005, S.5 (109th): Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, GOVTRACK (Feb. 10,
2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/109-2005/s9. This seems to stand on the cusp of the three
categories.
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Consider in this regard the Court’s dispute over severability in the
hyperpartisan and uniquely prominent Supreme Court health care case. A
majority of the Court held that the requirement that states opt into a new
Medicaid program or risk losing all of their medical funding was
unconstitutional as exceeding the Congress’s spending power.89 The
dissenters agreed on this point, but also would have struck down the
“individual mandate” portion of the law, requiring individuals to purchase
health insurance or pay a penalty to the government, as exceeding
Congress’s taxing and Commerce Clause powers.90 The majority upheld
this provision as a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power.91
Both the majority and dissent had to confront the question of
severability, because each took the position that a portion of the law was
unconstitutional. With part of the law unconstitutional, should the
remaining parts survive? Both opinions referred to congressional intent in
their severability analyses.
The majority held that the unconstitutional Medicaid provision was
severable from the rest of the Act:
We have no way of knowing how many States will accept the terms of
the [Medicaid] expansion, but we do not believe Congress would have
wanted the whole Act to fall, simply because some may choose not to
participate. The other reforms Congress enacted, after all, will remain
fully operative as a law, and will still function in a way consistent with
Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute. Confident that
Congress would not have intended anything different, we conclude that
the rest of the Act need not fall in light of our constitutional holding. 92

The dissenters reached the opposite conclusion, holding that even the
unrelated provisions of the health care law needed to fall with the
unconstitutional provisions. Striking the entire statute, the dissenters
claimed, was actually a lesser exercise of judicial power than keeping the
rest intact, because striking the entire act would “allow[] Congress” to
decide after the decision which provisions to reenact.93
Justice Scalia (one of the dissenting Justices) had it half right when he
remarked on the third day of the health care oral argument that the danger
of severance was that there would not be enough votes in the Senate to
overcome a filibuster of a bill repealing the rest of the Act: “You can’t
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–08 (2012).
Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2593–2601.
Id. at 2608 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting).
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repeal the rest of the Act because you’re not going to get 60 votes in the
Senate to repeal the rest.”94 This was only half right because if the Court
would have stricken the entire statute (as Justice Scalia voted to do with the
other dissenters), there also would not have been enough votes in the
Senate to overcome a filibuster of a bill reinstating the rest of the Act.
Indeed, during the same oral argument at which Justice Scalia made
the “60 votes” comment, he could only see the danger of the Court
mistakenly allowing the rest of the law to stand but not the parallel danger
of mistakenly striking down the entire law. Justice Scalia called upon the
lawyer Paul Clement to recognize the danger of “legislative inertia” when
Clement conceded in response to a question by Justice Sotomayor:
[I]f you strike down only the individual mandate, Congress could say the
next day: Well, that’s the last thing we ever wanted to do so we will
strike down the rest of the statute immediately and then try to fix the
problem. So, whatever you do, Congress is going to have options. 95

More realistically, Clement should have said, “So whatever you do is
likely to be the last word.” The Court’s severability decision was almost
certain to be final because neither party in the partisan Congress would be
94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Trans.
LEXIS 28 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400).
95. Consider this exchange:
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I want a bottom line is why don't we let Congress fix it?
MR. CLEMENT: Well, let me answer the bottom line question, which is, no matter what you
do in this case, at some point there's going to be—if you strike down the mandate, there is
going to be something for Congress to do. The question is really, what task do you want to
give Congress. Do you want to give Congress the task of fixing the statute after something
has been taken out, especially a provision at the heart, or do you want to give Congress the
task of fixing health care? And I think it would be better in this situation—
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We are not taking—If we strike down one provision, we are not
taking that power away from Congress. Congress could look at it without the mandatory
coverage provision and say, this model doesn't work; let's start from the beginning. Or it could
choose to fix what it has. We are not declaring—one portion doesn't force Congress into any
path.
MR. CLEMENT: And of course that's right, Justice Sotomayor, and no matter what you do
here, Congress will have the options available. So if you, if you strike down only the
individual mandate, Congress could say the next day: Well, that's the last thing we ever
wanted to do so we will strike down the rest of the statute immediately and then try to fix the
problem. So whatever you do, Congress is going to have options. The question is—
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, there is such a thing as legislative inertia, isn't there?
MR. CLEMENT: That's exactly what I was going to say, Justice Scalia, which is, I think the
question for this Court is, we all recognize there is legislative inertia. And then the question
is: What is the best result in light of that reality?
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Are you suggesting that we should take on more power to the
Court?
MR. CLEMENT: No—
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Because Congress would choose to take one path rather than
another. That's sort of taking onto the Court more power than one I think would want.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–6, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 28
(2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400).
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able to repeal or reinstate the relevant parts of the health care law through
the normal legislative process.
A bipartisan override might have been possible under special
circumstances, such as if the Court struck the mandate and retained the
entire rest of the law—putting the powerful insurance industry into an
untenable situation financially. There will still be some overrides that even
a polarized Congress will agree upon on a bipartisan basis.96 But the main
point remains clear: the end of override dialogue increases the Court’s
power at Congress’s expense.
D. OVERRIDES IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE
Although the decline in the number of overrides has strengthened the
Supreme Court compared to Congress, a full assessment of the relative
power of the Court and Congress depends on more than the number of
congressional overrides. Consider three additional factors:
First, and significantly, Congress retains some power over the Court
through the Senate’s power to confirm Supreme Court Justices, an issue
considered below in Part III. (Of course, Congress also has the power to
impeach Justices.)
Second, even in the rare circumstance in which Congress overrides a
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decision, Widiss’s evidence shows
that the Court sometimes ignores or sidesteps it. Widiss notes that Congress
was careful in its override of the Ledbetter decision to amend not just the
statute directly at issue in the case (Title VII), but parallel provisions under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act in order to avoid this reaction
from the Court.97 More generally, the Court has great control over its
docket and the scope of its rulings. These facts help expand the power of
96. To take another recent example, Congress passed the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177 (2010), in response to United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct.
1577 (2010), which held an earlier statute barring depiction of animal cruelty violated the First
Amendment. See 156 CONG. REC. S7653–54 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy). While this was not a statutory override, it does illustrate that there are some instances in which
even a polarized Congress may find common ground against the Supreme Court.
97. Widiss, supra note 52, at 923 n.371. Widiss notes an interesting lower court application of
the acquiescence rule:
[Congress’s override] was insufficient to end reliance on Ledbetter as a shadow precedent. In
a recent case arising under the FMLA, the district court held Ledbetter controlling because
Congress had not amended the FMLA when it amended these other statutes. Maher v. Int’l
Paper Co., 600 F. Supp. 2d 940, 950 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
Widiss, supra note 52, at 923 n.371.
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the Court against Congress.
Third, when it comes to constitutional adjudication, the Court also has
expanded its power against Congress to strike down federal statutes as
unconstitutional. For example, the Court in the last few decades has
required Congress, like litigants in court, to come forward with specific
evidence of unconstitutional action by states in order to be permitted to
exercise some of its powers against the states.98 In one of the most recent
important examples of the Court imposing a tough evidentiary standard on
Congress, the Court warned Congress that it was likely to overturn a key
provision of the Voting Rights Act if Congress did not go back and rewrite
the law, taking into account recent evidence of state racial discrimination in
voting which might justify the new law.99 Yet the same forces which seem
to inhibit congressional overrides of Court statutory interpretation decisions
may also be responsible for Congress’s failure to respond to the Court’s
invitation to update the Voting Rights Act, and the issue of the Act’s
constitutionality likely will be back before the Court soon.
In the health care case, it is unclear whether the Court’s Spending
Clause holding or the opinion of the four dissenters combined with Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion on the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power will rein in congressional power when similar issues arise. Whether
it does or not is in the hands of Supreme Court Justices, not Congress.
II. EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES
What explains the steep decline in overrides by Congress of Supreme
Court statutory decisions? I argue below that the increase in political
polarization in Congress is a likely (at least partial) culprit. Before turning
to polarization, I consider other potential sources for the decline, finding
that a decline in Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions may also
be part of the answer.
98. See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH L. REV. 80
(2001) (exploring recent judicial activism and the corresponding disrespect of Congress).
99. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 229 (2009)
(“The burden remains with Congress to prove that the extreme circumstances warranting § 5’s
enactment persist today. A record of scattered infringement of the right to vote is not a constitutionally
acceptable substitute.”). See Richard L. Hasen, Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181 (analyzing how the Court avoided making a constitutional decision in
NAMUDNO).
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A. DECLINE IN (MAJOR) FEDERAL LEGISLATION
At first blush, it might appear that the decline in overrides simply
tracks a decline in the number of federal statutes passed by Congress. If
Congress is generally passing fewer laws, then it is possible that laws
which override Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases have declined
at a proportional rate. The data show that the number of public laws passed
by Congress indeed has declined markedly in the past two decades. But the
pattern of passage in federal legislation does not match up with the pattern
of congressional override activity.
As illustrated in Figure 3, according to data from the “Resume of
Congressional Activity” produced by Congress, the number of public laws
passed by Congress has declined over time.100

Despite the decline, the pattern on legislation rates generally does not
track the pattern on Congressional override activity illustrated in Figure 1.
From 1967–74, the first period of Eskridge’s override study, Congress
100. I computed the data using the Résumé of Congressional Activity for each Congress. Résumé
of
Congressional
Activity,
United
States
Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_column_table/Resumes.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
See also Ezra Klein’s WonkBlog, which alerted me to this data set. Ezra Klein, 14 Reasons Why This Is
the Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST (July 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezraklein/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-the-worst-congress-ever/.
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passed an average of 648 public laws per two-year Congress. From 1975–
90, during the period of a doubling of the amount of override activity
compared to the 1967–74 period, the average number of public laws
actually fell to 559. From 1991 through 2010, the average number of public
laws fell to 410 per Congress, a drop of 27 percent compared to the 1975–
1990 period. During the same period, the number of overrides per session
dropped 68 percent compared to the 1975–1990 period (and nearly 78
percent comparing the 1975–1990 period with the 2001–2012 period).
Looking at the overall trends, the number of overrides does not appear
closely correlated to the total number of public laws which Congress
passes.
Nor does the override pattern seem related to the amount of “major
legislation” passed in Congress, at least according to one measure of
“major legislation.”101 Using data compiled by David Mayhew of major
federal legislation in the post-World War II period,102 I examined
Congress’s record of passing such legislation from 1967 to 2010. The
average number of major laws passed per Congress in the 1967–74 period
was nineteen. Congress averaged just 10.1 major laws from the 1975–90
period (the period in which overrides doubled) and that number rose to
twelve major laws per Congress from 1991–2010 when overrides fell
dramatically. There appears to be no relationship between the number of
overrides and the amount of “major legislation” passed by Congress.
101. The measure I use for “major legislation,” David Mayhew’s count based primarily upon
year-end press coverage, is controversial. See SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 79 (2003) (noting that Mayhew and his critics disagree on
whether the consequence of major legislation differs in times of divided or united government). On the
relationship of Mayhew’s laws and political polarization, see Nolan McCarty, The Policy Effects of
Political Polarization, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT
AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 223, 237–40 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, eds., 2007). See also
NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE, & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF
IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 183 (2006) (“Polarization appears to reduce output across a broad
spectrum of possible legislation.”). For purposes of this article, Mayhew’s rough measure seems
adequate enough to measure whether the pattern of passage of major legislation mirrors the override
patterns in Congress.
102. Mayhew originally compiled data through 1991 for his book, DAVID MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE
GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–1990 (1991), and posted that
data, along with updates on major legislation (for the second edition of his book) through 2008 on his
website.
David
Mayhew,
Datasets
for
Divided
We
Govern
(1991),
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/data3.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). He supplied the 2009–2010
list of major legislation to me via email, as it is not yet posted on his site.
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One obvious question is why the amount of “major legislation” has
not declined along with the decline in overrides. The answer seems to be
that not all “major legislation” is equally important, and Congress always
has an incentive to pass some legislation to show that Congress is
“working” and sometimes needs to respond to major external events (such
as September 11 or the 2008 financial crisis). It would take a much finergrained measure than Mayhew’s “major legislation” measure to know if the
quality and reach of congressional legislation has declined over time.
B. A DECLINE IN (OR CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF) SUPREME COURT
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DECISIONS
Although override activity does not track the general trend of
lawmaking in Congress, trends of Supreme Court statutory interpretation
activity look somewhat more promising. Over time, the Supreme Court has
decided fewer federal statutory interpretation cases, just as it has decided
fewer cases overall.103
103. On the reasons for the decline in the Court’s docket over time, see Ryan J. Owens & David
A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012).
Chief Justice Roberts recently opined that the overall number of Supreme Court cases may be dropping
because of a supposed drop in the amount of “major legislation” passed by Congress. Jeannette Lee,
Chief Justice Notes Lack of Major Legislation Passed By Congress, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 4, 2007),
http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/politics/20070504-0318-wst-chiefjustice-alaska.html (“‘No one
actually knows why the number of cases we are taking is declining,’ said Roberts . . . . ‘I think there
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I analyzed the trends with Supreme Court statutory interpretation case
law using the Supreme Court Database maintained at Washington
University in St. Louis.104

As Figure 5 illustrates, from 1967 to 1974, the first period of
Eskridge’s override study, the Supreme Court averaged about forty-three
statutory interpretation cases per year.105 From 1975 to 1990, the Court
averaged forty-eight statutory interpretation cases per year. The doubling in
overrides from the first to the second periods in Eskridge’s study cannot be
explained by the slight rise in the number of statutory interpretation cases
in the second period.
In the years 1991–2010, the Court averaged 27.7 cases per year, a 43
percent drop compared to the 1975–1990 period. The drop in the number of
Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases therefore may explain part of
the drop in the number of congressional overrulings: there are simply fewer
Supreme Court cases for Congress to overrule (though of course Congress
really are three significant reasons. The first is the lack of any major legislation coming out of Congress
in the last couple of decades.’”). Mayhew’s data are inconsistent with this hypothesis.
104. THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
The database is based upon data originally coded by Harold J. Spaeth. The Genesis of the Database,
THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/about.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
105. I computed these figures using the U.S. Supreme Court Database, supra note 104, searching
all Supreme Court opinions from 1967–2010 coded as involving “Federal Statutes.”
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can also choose to overrule cases from earlier periods). It is not clear how
much of the decline in override activity may be attributable to a decline in
the number of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, given how
the earlier patterns in overrides and Supreme Court decisions do not match
up.
A related possibility is that Congress now overrides fewer cases
because members of Congress are now more likely to agree with the
outcome of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases: there is no need
to override a correct decision.106
This hypothesis seems unlikely when judged against the evidence. As
Figure 6 demonstrates, since the mid-1970s, Supreme Court statutory
interpretation decisions coded as “liberal” have generally ranged between
40 and 60 percent of total statutory decisions.107 There is no general pattern
of ideological direction which could explain a decline in overrides: liberals
and conservatives in Congress each are likely to disagree with around half
of the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions. Thus, there is no overall
change in ideological direction on the Court in the relevant period which
would explain the pattern of sharply declining overrides.

106. Alternatively, it is possible that congressional deference to Supreme Court statutory
interpretation has increased in the last twenty years. I am unaware of any evidence that Members’ of
Congress attitudes toward the Supreme Court has recently shifted in this direction.
107. The U.S. Supreme Court Database coded the direction of these cases as “liberal” or
“conservative.”
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C. POLITICAL POLARIZATION
With these other potential explanations at most providing only a part
of the story, I turn to the possibility that overrides are declining in part
because of political polarization. The data here draw from Keith Poole and
Howard Rosenthal’s well-accepted data posted at Voteview.com.108 Poole,
Rosenthal, and additional collaborators have coded roll call votes and other
data to produce ideological measures for each member of the House and
Senate.
Using these data, there is no question that today’s Congress is the
most polarized by party since the late nineteenth-century.109 Congress is
likely to become even more polarized going forward, especially as the few
remaining moderate senators leave the Senate, with many likely replaced
by Tea Party Republicans (for example, Ted Cruz replaced Texas’s Kay
Bailey Huchison110).
In a story told in great detail elsewhere,111 polarization in Congress
108. These data and next five charts (Figures 7–11) are used with the permission of Professor
Poole.
109. An Update on Political Polarization (Through 2011) (Jan. 30, 2012), VOTEVIEW BLOG,
http://voteview.com/blog/?p=284.
110. Tea Party Darling Cruz Wins Texas’ US Senate Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 7, 2012,
http://www.kvue.com/news/Tea-party-darling-Cruz-wins-Texas-US-Senate-seat-177570921.html.
111. See, e.g., McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political Polarization, supra note 101, at 224–32;
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began with the ideological realignment in the South following the Civil
Rights Era, as conservative Southern Democrats moved to the Republican
Party. Figure 7 shows the ideological distance between the parties over
time using the well-respected database of roll call votes compiled by Poole,
Rosenthal and their newer collaborators.
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 287–97 (2011).
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Figure 7.

Figures 8 and 9 show the steep decline in the percentage of moderates
in the House and Senate.
Figure 8.

Figure 9.
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Figures 10 and 11 show the sharp drop in the number of “overlapping”
Senators and House members—Republicans who are more liberal than the
most conservative Democrat and Democrats who are more conservative
than the most liberal Republican. These political animals are now extinct.
Figure 10.

Figure 11.
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These charts tell a story consistent with Eskridge’s evidence of the
changes over time in the number of congressional overrides. Before the
1990s, there were a number of liberal Republicans and conservative
Democrats in the House, and many more moderates in both parties. This
created ample space for bipartisan overrides of Supreme Court statutory
decisions. The number of moderates started plummeting in the 1980s and
the trend has continued ever since. The decline of these moderates has
made it harder to put together a winning voting coalition to overturn
Supreme Court statutory decisions.
It is not only that moderates, liberal Republicans, and conservative
Democrats have left Congress; it is that those who remain have become
less willing to seek bipartisan compromise. Of the “Gang of 14” who
sought a compromise on federal judicial nominations in 2005 and averted a
filibuster showdown, “just seven will be in the Senate in 2013. And that
number includes Arizona Sen. John McCain (R) who moved heavily
rightward to win his primary election in the 2010 election cycle.”112
Before the 1990s in Congress, there was more room for bipartisan
legislation to reverse the Supreme Court. The realignment in Congress and
steep dip in the number of moderates in the late-1980s and early-1990s
coincides with the steep decline in the number of congressional
overrides.113
112. Chris Cillizza, Think This Congress is Bad? Just Wait., WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:20
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/think-this-congress-is-bad-justwait/2012/08/01/gJQAvdTKPX_blog.html.
113. See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of
Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 782 (2011) (“[P]arty polarization has played a
significant role in the decline in constitutional hearings in every congressional committee except the
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Consider the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reversed a large number
of conservative Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. It is almost unthinkable today that such a measure
could pass in the very conservative Republican House, or get past a
Republican filibuster in a Democratic Senate. Even the Voting Rights Act
renewal, which passed the Senate on a 98-0 vote in 2006, could well have
been filibustered if it came up now given a sea change in Republican
attitudes about the Act within the covered states and the rise of mainstream
Republicans ready to contend that a key part of the Act is
unconstitutional.114 Indeed, renewal might not even get a vote in the
Republican House today. The hardening of positions likely explains
congressional silence after the Supreme Court signaled that Congress
needed to fix the Voting Rights Act or the Court would declare it
unconstitutional.
Partisan overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions remain
possible, but only when the conditions are right. Republicans were able to
overturn the Hamdan decision granting certain habeas rights to enemy
combatants by having a Republican President strongly pushing for the
reversal and enough Senate Democrats conservative on national security
issues to allow the vote to go through in the Senate. Democrats were able to
overturn Ledbetter and its tough statute of limitations for certain
employment discrimination claims when the President made it a campaign
issue and a priority as he entered office with high political capital,
Democrats controlled the House and Senate (and at the time had nearly a
filibuster-proof majority), and Senate Democrats gained the support of
women Republican Senators who crossed party lines to vote in favor of the
bill.
Both of these overrides required an unusual set of events: a President,
House, and Senate majority of the same party; a President with ample
political capital; and enough cross-over votes to beat a filibuster
(something which looks unlikely to occur frequently as the remaining
Senate moderates retire or are beaten in elections). Consider again how
President Obama got the health care law through Congress without a vote
to spare in the Senate. Unless those conditions arise again, it is hard to see
Judiciary Committees.”).
114. Josh Gerstein, Voting Rights Act Under Siege, POLITICO (Feb. 19, 2012, 7:06 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73058.html; Richard L. Hasen, Online VRA Symposium:
The Voting Rights Act, Congressional Silence, and the Political Polarization, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 10,
2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-vra-symposium-the-voting-rights-actcongressional-silence-and-the-political-polarization/.
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either side being able to accomplish much to change health care law even if
Republicans capture the Senate and the Presidency in 2016.
To test whether we are seeing a decline in the number of bipartisan
overrides compared to partisan overrides I examined each of the laws
which appeared on both Mayhew’s list of major legislation and on either
Eskridge’s list of overrides (confined to overrides of the Supreme Court,
and not lower federal court cases) or my list of overrides from 1991 to
2010 contained in Appendix I.115 By focusing on these major cases, I aim
to eliminate most technical overrides and focus on those laws which were
likely to be significant pieces of legislation salient to Members of
Congress.116
With one exception,117 I classified an override from the list as
“bipartisan” if on the final roll call vote the bill obtained “yes” votes from
at least twenty senators of each party and at least forty House members of
each party. If there were fewer than twenty senators from each party or
forty House members from each party supporting the bill, I classified it as
“partisan.”118
There are thirty overlapping laws on Mayhew’s list of major
legislation and on Eskridge’s or my list of overrides.119 Six of these
overrides occurred in the 1967–1974 period, and five of six were bipartisan
overrides (83 percent). Seventeen of these overrides occurred in the 1975–
1990 period, and fifteen of seventeen (88 percent) were bipartisan
overrides. One of the two partisan overrides in this period missed being
classified as bipartisan by a single Senate vote (nineteen Republican
senators voted for it).
115. In the analysis which follows, I exclude 2011–12 because Mayhew has not yet listed his
major legislation for this period.
116. Some of these overrides appear to be minor pieces of more significant legislation, however.
117. This exception is for the Detainee Transfer Act. See supra notes 85–88.
118. These figures for measuring bipartisan support are somewhat arbitrary. If I lower the number
of supporting senators in each party from twenty to only ten Senators, I would classify as “bipartisan”
only three additional overrides out of the total number of overrides of major legislation (including
amendments) from 1967–2010. If I raise the number of supporting House members from each party
from forty to eighty House members, I would classify as “bipartisan” only three fewer overrides out of
the total number of overrides of major legislation (including amendments) from 1967–2010. The fact
that my numbers change little if I halve the number of senators or double the number of House
members indicates that my standard of twenty senators and forty House members is a reasonable
measure of bipartisanship. (Of these six total possible changes, only one of the six involves legislation
passed since 1990, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which was supported by twelve Democratic
senators and would be classified as bipartisan if I lowered the standard to the support of ten senators of
each party.)
119. See infra Appendix II for the list of overlapping overrides.
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Seven overrides from this list occurred from 1991 to 2010. Just under
half of the overrides were bipartisan; just over half were partisan, with one
law barely being classified as bipartisan. The seven overrides are: the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (overruling nine Supreme Court civil rights cases)
(bipartisan); the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (bipartisan,
although the override of Barnett Bank of Marion County., N.A. v. Nelson120
seems minor and did not get mentioned at any point in the New York
Times); the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (overruling Rasul) (partisan);
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (overturning a Supreme Court
decision on diversity jurisdiction of unincorporated associations) (barely
partisan); the Military Commission Act of 2006 (overruling Hamdan)
(partisan); the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of
2009 (giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products) (bipartisan);
and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (overruling Ledbetter)
(partisan).
Figure 12 shows the percentage of partisan overrides in each of the
three periods.

This rise in partisan overrides of major legislation is subject to a
caveat. Mayhew’s list of major legislation does not count many significant
amendments to existing law (which override Supreme Court case law).121 I
120.
121.

Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
On the conditions when Congress is likely to amend significant legislation, see Forrest
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identified eight significant amendments from Eskridge’s or my list not
included on Mayhew’s list from 1972 to 2010.122 Each of these
amendments, including two in the most recent 1991–2010 period, were
bipartisan overrides of Supreme Court cases. Figure 13 shows that with
these laws included, the extent of bipartisan overrides in the most recent
period does not look quite as dramatic, but is still much higher compared to
the earlier periods.

Whether or not one considers the amendments in this assessment, the
trend is clear: Congress is passing fewer bipartisan overrides of major
legislation (both absolutely and as a percentage of all override legislation),
and there is a potential for more partisan overrides in the future under the
right conditions.
As moderates continue to leave Congress, and as members of both
Houses become more polarized, the chances of bipartisan overrides
diminish. Polarized overrides will arise in periods of unified government.
In addition, Congress will continue to pass technical overrides on occasion
There is enough legislation passed by even a polarized Congress of a more
technical nature, and overrides of Supreme Court decisions will likely
continue on issues of low salience or those pushed by lobbyists. But the
Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI.
252 (2008).
122. The list of these amendments appears infra Appendix III. Each of these amendments received
significant coverage in the New York Times.
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most important overrides of Supreme Court decisions are likely to remain
fewer in number and supported by one party over the opposition of the
other in conditions of unified government.
III. POLARIZATION AND THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS
PROCESS
Overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions are one
important way in which Congress interacts with the Supreme Court.
Another key interaction is the Senate’s role in confirming Supreme Court
judicial nominees. Aside from overrides and confirmation, Congress has
little leverage to influence the Supreme Court. Polarization in both the
Senate and the Supreme Court could complicate the confirmation process
going forward, potentially changing the nature of the Senate, the Supreme
Court, or both.
A. SUPREME COURT PARTISAN REALIGNMENT
Part II of this Article described the rise of polarization in the Senate
and the loss of Senate moderates. Consider now polarization at the
Supreme Court.
Ideological polarization at the Supreme Court is nothing new. Each
term, the Court issues a fair number of decisions on 5-to-4 (“5-4”) votes,
and many of those decisions are ideological, with liberals siding against
conservatives.123 Among the issues on which the Court has divided 5-4
along ideological lines in the last few years are abortion,124 affirmative
action,125 campaign finance,126 and the treatment of enemy combatants.127
Over the last twelve years, the Court has issued an average of nineteen
5-4 decisions each term, with 70 percent of those 5-4 divides representing
an ideological split and 62 percent of those ideological splits resulting in a
conservative victory.128 Justice Kennedy has been the most important
123. The statistics in this section come from Tom Goldstein’s SCOTUSblog StatPack. Stat Pack,
Final, October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG at 14 (June 30, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/SB_five-to-four_OT11_final.pdf.
124. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). This issue is back before the Court in the October
2012 term in the case Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, and the result may be to overrule Grutter.
Adam Liptak, College Diversity Nears Its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/college-diversity-nears-its-last-stand.html.
126. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
127. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
128. SCOTUSBLOG Stat Pack, supra note 123, at 14.

HASE7

140

1/25/2013 12:30 PM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:---

swing voter, as a conservative Justice who sometimes sides with liberals:
from the October 2006 to October 2010 term, Justice Kennedy has been in
the majority in 5-4 decisions 80 percent of the time.129 The big surprise in
the health care ruling was that it was Chief Justice Roberts, and not Justice
Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote with the liberal Justices in upholding
the bulk of the health care law.
While ideological polarization at the Supreme Court is not new, what
is new is that ideological polarization lines up with a partisan polarization:
on the current Court, all the conservative Justices have been nominated by
Republican presidents and all the liberal Justices have been nominated by
Democratic presidents. President George W. Bush replaced
conservative/moderate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with strong
conservative Justice Samuel Alito. Justices John Paul Stevens and David
Souter were the last liberal-leaning Republican-appointed Justices to leave
the Court, replaced by Democratic President Obama with Justices Sonia
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. Justice Byron White was the last
conservative-leaning Democrat-appointed Justice to leave the Court,
replaced with strong liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg by President
Clinton.130 Given the extraordinary length of Supreme Court terms, there
can well be a lag between popular (or congressional) opinion and the
opinions of Supreme Court Justices. Justices have huge room to maneuver
and decide cases consistent with their preferences, regardless of current
public opinion.131
However, the new alignment of ideology and party poses dangers for
the Court. Partisan divides may undermine the Court’s legitimacy, as the
public may be more inclined to view the Court’s decisions—fairly or not—
as partisan decisions made by partisan actors. Public approval of the
Supreme Court has been declining recently,132 and it is possible (although
by no means certain) that the decline will continue, undermining the
129. Id. at 15.
130. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, Statistics & Lists, United States Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).
131. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 139–42 (noting the lag time issue).
132. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in Poll, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-ofamericans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html. For a careful assessment of how the Court’s
legitimacy has fared in the wake of its controversial decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), see
James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003).
The question is whether the Court which survived a crisis of legitimacy after the 2000 election would be
able to survive a new crisis at a time of increased polarization and partisan realignment.
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Court’s legitimacy. Some observers have speculated that Chief Justice
Roberts sided with the liberals in the health care case precisely to maintain
the Court’s legitimacy among elites and the public.133
In addition to affecting public opinion, party realignment threatens the
Supreme Court judicial confirmation process, the issue to which I now turn.
B. SENATE CONFIRMATIONS IN THE NEW PARTISAN ERA
Recent attacks on the Supreme Court from the left have accused the
five conservative, Republican-appointed Justices of deciding cases such as
Citizens United, which opened up corporate spending in federal elections,
to benefit Republicans politically.134 The more people think of the Justices
as dividing on partisan lines and deciding cases the same partisan way in
which legislators decide on legislative actions (whether or not that is an
accurate characterization135), the easier it will be for senators to oppose
judicial nominations on ideological and partisan grounds.
Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ vote to uphold the health care law, his
opinion on the scope of the Commerce Clause narrowed congressional
power and was very similar to the position taken by the four health care
dissenters and opposed by the four liberal, Democrat-appointed Justices on
the Court. In coming terms we can expect similar ideological and partisan
splits on the Court regarding issues such as affirmative action, voting
rights, and abortion rights, with the Chief Justice proving to be no
liberal.136 The claim that “Republican Justices” decide controversial
133. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Why Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court, SLATE (Jun. 28,
2012,
3:51
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/john_roberts_broke_with_cons
ervatives_to_preserve_the_supreme_court_s_legitimacy.html.
134. Adam Liptak, In Supreme Court Term, Striking Unity on Major Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30,
2012,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/us/supreme-courts-recent-term-a-newphase.html (“In the wake of the blockbuster Citizens United decision, which by a 5-to-4 vote along
ideological lines opened the door for corporations and unions to spend as much as they like to support
or oppose political candidates, the court was accused of naked partisanship for seeming to favor
Republican interests.”).
135. See id. (“But in the last term, the Roberts court proved itself resistant to caricature.”).
136. Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than We Knew, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 13, 2012,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/aug/16/bigger-victory-we-knew/ (“The
Court will have the opportunity to overrule its 2003 decision allowing state universities to take an
admission candidate’s race into account, as one factor among others, in seeking a diverse student body.
The conservative justices might wish to abolish affirmative action altogether, or to impose more
stringent restrictions on it. They will also have the opportunity to reverse lower courts by upholding the
Defense of Marriage Act, which forbids federal agencies to treat gay marriages as real, for example by
allowing a gay couple to file a joint income tax return. The same justices will also be asked to strike
down an important part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires states with particularly bad
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constitutional cases in line with Republican values and that “Democratic
Justices” decide many such cases in line with Democratic values will have
increasing resonance.
This partisan realignment comes as senators have become more vocal
and explicit in opposing Supreme Court nominees on ideological grounds.
As Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland found:
While it is true that ideology has always played some role in [Supreme
Court] judicial appointments, its importance seems to be increasing with
time. . . . [T]he degree to which candidates share the political values of
their nominating President is higher now than it was just three decades
ago. And . . . although Senators of today—no less than those of
yesterday—attend to the nominees’ qualifications, ideological
compatibility now takes precedence.137

Consider the 2005 statement then-Senator Obama made against the
nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States:
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind Judge Roberts is qualified to
sit on the highest court in the land. Moreover, he seems to have the
comportment and the temperament that makes for a good judge. He is
humble, he is personally decent, and he appears to be respectful of
different points of view. It is absolutely clear to me that Judge Roberts
truly loves the law. He couldn’t have achieved his excellent record as an
advocate before the Supreme Court without that passion for the law, and
it became apparent to me in our conversation that he does, in fact, deeply
respect the basic precepts that go into deciding 95 percent of the cases
that come before the Federal court—adherence to precedence, a certain
modesty in reading statutes and constitutional text, a respect for
procedural regularity, and an impartiality in presiding over the
adversarial system. All of these characteristics make me want to vote for
Judge Roberts.
The problem I face—a problem that has been voiced by some of my
other colleagues, both those who are voting for Mr. Roberts and those
who are voting against Mr. Roberts—is that while adherence to legal
precedent and rules of statutory or constitutional construction will
dispose of 95 percent of the cases that come before a court, so that both a
voting rights records to seek federal permission for new changes in their election laws. No doubt,
moreover, they will soon find a chance further to constrict or even to abolish abortion rights. Roberts
may want to blunt the anticipated accusations of political partisanship that any right-wing decisions in
these cases will likely attract by supporting Obama’s health care program now. If so, he will have been
immeasurably helped by his new enemies in the right-wing media who are painting him as a secret
liberal, or as a turncoat villain with a deteriorating mind.”).
137. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Increasing Importance of Ideology in
the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 610 (2008).
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Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at the same place most of the time on
those 95 percent of the cases—what matters on the Supreme Court is
those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult. In those cases, adherence
to precedent and rules of construction and interpretation will only get
you through the 25th mile of the marathon. That last mile can only be
determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns,
one’s broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and
breadth of one’s empathy. 138

The shift to explicit consideration of ideology and away from at least
an ostensible focus on judicial competence has coincided with increasing
partisan split on votes for Supreme Court judicial confirmations. Putting
aside the contentious Bork hearings (to which I will return) and Justice
Thomas’s confirmation vote, which occurred after a highly contentious
hearing in which he was accused of sexual harassment,139 Supreme Court
nominees until recently140 enjoyed bipartisan support in confirmation votes.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy were approved on unanimous votes,141 and
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg had few votes against them.142
More recent votes have seen much more substantial opposition to
nominees along party lines. Chief Justice Roberts had twenty-two votes
cast against him, all by Democrats and without any objections raised to his
qualifications.143 Justice Alito had forty-two votes cast against him (two
more than necessary for a filibuster, had Democrats decided to filibuster),
gaining “yes” votes from only four Democrats.144 Justice Sotomayor had
138. 151 CONG. REC. S10365–66 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Barack Obama),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-09-22/pdf/CREC-2005-09-22-pt1PgS10365.pdf.
139. Nancy Gibbs, Hill vs. Thomas: An Ugly Circus, TIME MAGAZINE, Oct. 21, 1991, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974074,00.html.
140. Senate rejections of Supreme Court nominees have fluctuated over time. The Senate rejected
three nominees besides Bork in the twentieth century, and Justice Fortas withdrew his nomination to be
Chief Justice after a filibuster. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 130.
Nonetheless, the vast majority of Supreme Court nominees in the last century were confirmed. In the
twenty-first century, so far only one nominee, Harriet Miers, withdrew her nomination. None have been
filibustered. Id.
141. Justice Scalia was approved on a 98-0 vote and Kennedy on a 97-0 vote. Id. Justice Thomas’s
vote was 52 to 48, but the nomination became embroiled in controversy over sexual harassment
allegations. See Gibbs, supra note 139.
142. Justice Ginsburg was approved on a 96-3 vote, and Breyer, 87-9. Supreme Court
Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 130.
143. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress—1st Session, Legislation & Records, United
State
Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1
&vote=00245 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
144. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress—2nd Session, Legislation & Records, United
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thirty-one votes cast against her, garnering the support of nine
Republicans.145 The most recent nominee, Justice Kagan, had thirty-seven
votes cast against her, gaining only five Republican votes.146 Opposing
senators did not raise any serious questions about the qualifications of any
of these nominees.
Notably, three of the four Democrats voting for Justice Alito (Senators
Kent Conrad, Ben Nelson, and Robert Byrd) left the Senate, and three of
the five Republicans voting for Justice Kagan (Senators Judd Gregg,
Richard Lugar, and Olympia Snowe) also recently left the Senate. Each of
these senators was known as a moderate. Figure 14 shows the number of
“no” votes received by each current member of the Supreme Court during
the nomination process.147

The big question is whether the increasing partisan opposition to
Supreme Court nominees on ideological grounds will lead senators to begin
to consider filibustering Supreme Court nominees from the other party. The
State
Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2
&vote=00002 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
145. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—1st Session, Legislation & Records, United
State
Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1
&vote=00262 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
146. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—2nd Session, Legislation & Records, United
State
Senate,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2
&vote=00229 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
147. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 130.
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issue could come to a head when Justice Kennedy, the perennial “swing”
Justice, leaves the Court.148
In recent years, both Democratic senators and Republican senators
have filibustered, stalled, or put holds on lower court nominees, especially
nominees to the federal appellate courts. Senators are especially interested
in filibustering young appellate court judges, such as Republican Miguel
Estrada (filibustered by Democrats) or Democrat Goodwin Liu (filibustered
by Republicans), who appear on track for a Supreme Court nomination and
who would benefit from having judicial experience on the resume.149
The trend to fight over lower court nominees has only accelerated
during the Obama administration.150 Increasingly, partisans on both sides
(when their party was in the Senate majority) have called for the majority
to use the so-called “nuclear option”: a parliamentary move in which a bare
Senate majority would eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominees.151
It is hard to know how the much the battle over lower court judicial
nominations would resemble a battle over a Kennedy replacement. Lower
court nominations are of much lower salience than Supreme Court
nominations, especially a nomination to replace a swing Justice on a
sharply divided partisan court. When the moment comes for a new
nomination, interest groups will mobilize, social media will buzz, and
political partisans from all sides will put intense pressure on senators from
the opposition party to filibuster any nominee who would be a strong
conservative or liberal on the Court. Some will defend the filibuster as a
means of insuring the placement of ideological moderates on the Court.152
148. On Justice Kennedy’s importance as a “super median” Justice, see Lee Epstein & Tonja
Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2008).
149. John Steele Gordon, A Filibuster That Goes Around Comes Around, COMMENTARY (May 20,
2011, 1:55 PM), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/05/20/filibuster-that-goes-around-comesaround/; Meredith Shiner, Senate GOP Filibusters Goodwin Liu, POLITICO (May 19, 2011, 2:41 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55320.html.
150. For histories and analyses of this period, see Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter,
“Extraordinary Circumstances”: The Legacy of the Gang of 14 and a Proposal for Judicial
Nominations Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969 (2012); Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies in a
Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985 (2012); Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan Federal
Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769 (2010).
151. For an explanation of how the “nuclear option” would work, see Gerhardt & Painter, supra
note 150, at 974–76. On the modern filibuster as “one of the central features of American politics,” see
McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political Polarization, supra note 101, at 236.
152. See William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L. REV.
307, 323 (2008) (“In the meantime . . . de facto governance by supermajorities in the Senate should
continue. We simply see no other means of restraining the possibility that now, by the slimmest of
margins, presidents may imbed fellow partisans on the Supreme Court for spans of a quarter-century or
more.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster, the Median Senator, and
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But in the past, senators have not been willing to pull the trigger even when
it came to controversial nominations such as Justice Thomas’s and where
there were more than enough votes to filibuster.
The hardening of partisan positions in the Senate and the lack of
Senate moderates increases the chances that a stalemate over a Supreme
Court judicial nominee could lead to a standoff over the use of the
filibuster. In this way, a coming dispute differs markedly from the fight
over the Bork nomination. While some attribute the current tensions over
judicial nominees to the Bork fight,153 the Senate in the years following the
fight managed to overcome that division, easily confirming four of the next
five Supreme Court nominees (two Democrats and two Republicans)
unanimously or by lopsided majorities. But the four most recent nominees
now sitting (in the years furthest from the Bork hearings)—all eminently
well-qualified jurists—have been confirmed on sharply divided votes, with
substantial numbers of senators from the opposing party voting against the
nominee. Something seems to have changed fundamentally in the Senate.
C. POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF A SENATE SHOWDOWN
If the partisan Senate has an extended confrontation over a Supreme
Court judicial nominee, the confrontation might end in a number of ways.
The nominating president might withdraw a nomination, and nominate a
replacement candidate seen as more moderate by the minority threatening a
filibuster.154 Alternatively, the President and Senate majority might hold
firm on the original nominee, and trigger the nuclear option, removing the
possibility of filibustering Supreme Court (or all federal) judicial nominees.
Senators alternatively might conclude that triggering the nuclear option
could have potentially negative consequences for the Senate’s conduct of
business. They could strike a more radical compromise on Supreme Court
judicial nominations. For example, senators might limit judicial terms to
eighteen years, which would lower the costs of confirming an ideological
Justice to the Court and insure more turnover on the Court.155
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 258 (Senate filibuster “will tend to make
Justices more moderate, where moderate means having a jurisprudential view closer to the view held by
the median Senator.”).
153. See Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court
Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296 (2006). For a skeptical view of the importance of the Bork controversy on
more recent judicial nomination battles, see SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE &
DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–9 (2009).
154. I assume that if the President and Senate majority are of opposite parties, the President will
be more likely to nominate a moderate nominee marginally acceptable to the Senate majority.
155. For a review and critique of the various term limits proposals, see Mary L. Clark, Judicial
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The second of these options could change the nature of the Senate
greatly. A move away from the filibuster would turn the Senate into a more
majoritarian institution,156 and, in making the Senate more like the House,
it could further exacerbate partisan tensions. Ending the filibuster only as to
judicial nominees would strengthen the Senate compared to the Court, by
allowing greater control over the Court’s composition. Ending the filibuster
more broadly could give political parties in times of united government
(where a single party controls House, Senate, and Presidency) an
unprecedented opportunity to enact and change major public policies,
subject only to control by an ideologically divided Supreme Court.
Alternatively, Supreme Court term limits could change the nature of
the Court. By lowering the stakes, term limits should make ideological
judges easier to confirm. However, term limits might further solidify the
ideological nature of Supreme Court judging by providing a path for
presidents to nominate more ideological Justices. More speculatively, term
limits create a risk that Justices will judge keeping their future career
prospects in mind, especially as a judicial term comes to an end.157 Both of
these paths suggest dangers to the long term legitimacy of the Court, as the
public and elites may tend to see Justices as both ideological and selfinterested.
All of this analysis in Part III is undoubtedly speculative. Perhaps the
correlation of ideology and party in the Supreme Court will not matter to
the increasingly partisan Senate, and the Court’s legitimacy will remain
stable. The Senate confirmation process may chug along as always. But the
loss of Senate moderates makes it more likely than in the past that a
Supreme Court nomination could explode into a major political crisis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Political polarization is changing power relationships between
Congress and the Supreme Court, in some ways which are evident, such as
Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 841 (2011). Some of the proposals would
require constitutional amendment, and the precise nature of the proposals is beyond the scope of this
Article.
156. It would only be internally majoritarian. Because each state gets two senators regardless of
population, and some states have vastly larger populations than others, some filibusters actually could
promote (voter) majority rule. See generally FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP
THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1999) (examining the
effects of Senate apportionment on political outcomes and realities).
157. See Clark, supra note 155, at 904 (arguing against the ability of retiring Article III judges to
return to private practice following a term as a judge because of “the real and apparent threats to
judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity presented” by return).
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through a more ideological Supreme Court confirmation process, and in
some ways which have been mostly hidden, such as through the dramatic
decline in congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory
interpretation case law.
As Congress becomes ever more partisan and its moderates are forced
out or retire, and as Supreme Court Justices become associated increasingly
with the views of the President and party who appointed them, the
Congress-Supreme Court relationship is likely to change further.
Congressional overrides likely will occur infrequently, but more often on a
partisan basis in periods of unified government. Otherwise, the Court is
more likely to have the last word on federal statutory meaning.
In the longer term, the task of replacing a swing Supreme Court
Justice could lead to an unprecedented confrontation in the Senate, with the
potential to change the nature of the Senate, the Supreme Court, or both
bodies. As the institutions respond to the pressures of polarization, power
relationships will continue to shift.
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APPENDIX I.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME COURT STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION CASES, 1991–2012
YEAR

CONGRESSIONAL ACT

SUPREME

COURT

CASE

OVERRULED
2011

America Invents Act of 2011

Holmes Grp, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S.
826 (2002)

2011
2009

Federal Courts Jurisdiction and

Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335

Venue Act of 2011

(1960)

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery

United States v. Santos, 553 U.S.

Act of 2009

507 (2008)
Allison Engine Co., Inc. v.
United States ex rel. Sanders,
553 U.S. 662 (2008)

2009

Family Smoking Prevention and

FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Control Act of 2009

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120
(2000)

2009
2008

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &

2009

Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)

ADA Amendments Act of 2008

Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999)
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184
(2002)

2007

Open Government Act of 2007

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598
(2001)

2006

Trademark Dilution Revision Act

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,

of 2006

Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003)

2006

Military Commission Act of 2006

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.

2006

Voting Rights Act Amendments

Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S.

of 2006

461 (2003)

557 (2006)

Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
528 U.S. 320 (2000)
2005

Emergency

Supplemental

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
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(2001)

the Global War on Terror, and
Tsunami Relief
2005

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005

Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466

2005

Class Action Fairness Act of

United Steelworkers of America,

2005

AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny,

(2004)

Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965)
2002
1999

1996
1996
1996

The Job Creation and Worker

Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531

Assistance Act of 2002

U.S. 206 (2001)

Financial Services Modernization

Barnett Bank of Marion Cty.,

Act of 1999 (Graham-Leach-

N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25

Bliley)

(1996)

Antiterrorism

and

Effective

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298

Death Penalty Act of 1996

(1995)

False Statements Accountability

Hubbard v. United States, 514

Act of 1996

U.S. 695 (1995)

Federal Courts Improvement Act

Int’l Primate Prot. League v.

of 1996

Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund,
500 U.S. 72 (1991)
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522
(1984)

1995
1995

Reversal of Adams Fruit Co. v.

Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494

Barrett

U.S. 638 (1990)

ICC Termination Act of 1995

Oklahoma

Tax

Comm’n

v.

Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S.
175 (1995)
1995

Reconciliation of Budget of 1996

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115

1995

Paperwork Reduction Act of

Dole v. United Steelworkers of

1995

America, 494 U.S. 26 (1990)

(1994)

1994
1994

Money

Laundering

and

Ratzlaf v. United States, 510

Suppression Act of 1994

U.S. 135 (1994)

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994

Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of
Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96
(1989)
United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992)
Rake v. Wade, 508 US 464
(1993)
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1993

Religious Freedom Restoration

United States v. Nordic Village,

Act of 1993

Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992)

Negotiated Rates Act of 1993

Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v.

1993
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Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116
(1990)
1992
1991
1991
1991

Federal Facility Compliance Act

United States Dep’t of Energy v.

of 1992

Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992)

Criminal

Jurisdiction

Over

Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676

Indians Act of 1991

(1990)

Incarcerated Witness Fee Act of

Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498

1991

U.S. 184 (1991)

FDIC Improvement Act of 1991

Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350 (1991)

1991

Civil Rights Act of 1991

Patterson

v.

McLean

Credit

Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)
Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., 490
U.S. 900 (1989)
Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478
U.S. 310 (1986)
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989)
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437
(1987)
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717
(1986)
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989)
Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants
v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989)
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APPENDIX II.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME COURT STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION CASES, 1967–2010, ALSO APPEARING ON MAYHEW’S
LIST OF “MAJOR LEGISLATION”
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009
Military Commission Act of 2006
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Civil Rights Act of 1991
Immigration Act of 1990
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
Tax Reform Act of 1986
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
Copyrights Act (1976)
Tax Reform Act of 1976
Voting Rights Act Extension (1975)
Magnuson-Moss Warranty FTC Improvements Act (1974)
Freedom of Information Act (1974)
Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (1973)
Equal Employment Opportunity Amendment of 1972
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
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APPENDIX III.
SIGNIFICANT CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME COURT
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES THROUGH AMENDMENTS, 1967–
2010, NOT APPEARING ON MAYHEW’S LIST OF “MAJOR LEGISLATION”
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 2008
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978
Longshoreman’s & Harbor Workers Compensation Act Amendments of 1972
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APPENDIX IV.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX
Identifying congressional overrides is a challenge, as there is no single
repository of such information. It turns out to be an increasingly difficult
challenge, as committee reports appear less likely than twenty years ago
(the end of Eskridge’s study) to explicitly note a congressional override.
Thus, while Eskridge wrote that he did not count as overrides “statutes for
which the legislative history—mainly committee reports and hearings—
does not reveal a legislative focus on judicial decisions,”158 it appears
necessary to count some overrides of statutes where there is no committee
report showing a legislative focus on Supreme Court decisions. On the
other hand if, thanks to new technology, I am able to delve more deeply
into the legislative weeds than Eskridge was able to do in 1990, then I may
lose the apples-to-apples comparison with his data that I am hoping for.
I began my search using Westlaw, searching House and Senate
committee reports from 1991 to the present for indications that a successful
piece of federal legislation overturned, reversed, or modified a Supreme
Court statutory interpretation holding. Like Eskridge, I did not count
congressional bills which simply “codified” or “clarified” Supreme Court
cases, and I did not count bills which implicitly overruled a Supreme Court
statutory interpretation decision.159
When I shared an earlier draft of this Article with other scholars, some
scholars suggested additional possible overrides to me which did not come
up on my initial searches. I then refined my Westlaw search to capture
these additional overrides. I used the following search in the USCCANREP Westlaw database: (OVERRUL! MODIF! CORRECT! CLARIF!
REVERS! REJECT! DISAGREE! ERRONEOUS! MISINTERPRET!
OVERTURN! RESTOR!) /10 “SUPREME COURT” & date(aft 1990). It
captured almost all of the cases I and others had identified.160 As a backup,
158. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 332 n.1. Another problem is that Congress has no uniform
method of expressing its intention to override a statute. The language used in reports can vary wildly,
and even direct overrides often involve vague or oblique language. This makes it difficult to predict
exactly how Congress might express itself in any given instance, and occasionally gives rise to
considerable ambiguity as to whether a statute truly qualifies as an override.
159. Like Eskridge, Barnes excluded implicit overrides “on practical grounds; such overrides are
extremely difficult—if not impossible—to identify systematically.” BARNES, supra note 44, at 23.
160. Ironically, this search did not find a 1995 law entitled “Reversal of Adams Fruit Co. v.
Barrett.”
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my research assistant or I examined every mention of “Supreme Court” in
this database from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2012, and it
yielded a single additional case beyond the more restrictive search. I also
compared my results with Hausegger and Baum’s 1991–96 results.161
I also searched the Westlaw “JLR” (Journals and Law Review)
database for law review articles from 1990 forward mentioning potential
congressional overrides of federal statutes. This JLR search yielded a
handful of additional cases. Finally, I was able to get a copy of Hausegger
and Baum’s list of overrides from 1991–1996 and cross-referencing this list
yielded a few additional overrides.
I believe that these research methods have revealed most major
overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases since 1991.
However, despite these efforts, there is no doubt that I have missed some,
probably minor, overrides. For example, none of the legislative materials
on Westlaw indicate that the Anti-Terrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act
of 2006 overruled any Supreme Court cases. But upon hearing that
Congress passed the law with that intent, I asked UCI librarians to search
additional sources for express evidence of a congressional intent to
override. The librarians located a report, not available on Westlaw, which
confirms the intent to override.162 There may be other isolated overrides
neither mentioned in committee reports available on Westlaw nor noted in
journals or law reviews.
I have also erred on the side of including, rather than excluding,
questionable laws as overrides. For example, a House report on the 2009
law giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco as a drug describes the
Supreme Court as having concluded in a 2000 case that Congress did not
intend to give the FDA such authority. The report describes Congress in
2009 as giving the FDA such authority at this point going forward—
thereby modifying the law going forward, as opposed to reversing the
Court’s prior interpretation.163 I nonetheless coded this law as an override.
161. Hausegger & Baum, supra note 44.
162. Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process:
Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 90 (1995) (“Each of the current
bills would apparently overrule the recent Supreme Court case of Schlup v. Delo, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995)
by setting a higher burden of proof for newly discovered evidence of actual innocence.”).
163. H.R. REP. NO. 111-706, at 127 (2011) (“A resulting Supreme Court decision in 2000, while
acknowledging that tobacco use posed ‘perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the
United States,’ found that Congress had not given FDA authority over tobacco products as part of the
FFDCA. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act amends the FFDCA to grant FDA
the authority to regulate tobacco products.”).

